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Introduction
C hief among the issues that the U.S. Supreme Courtwill consider in HHS v. Florida is the question1 ofwhether Congress has the constitutional power to
apply a ‘‘minimum essential coverage requirement’’2 on
most nonelderly Americans. Opponents of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (the Affordable
Care Act or the Act) provision (referred to as the ‘‘Indi-
vidual Responsibility’’ requirement) argue that compel-
ling individuals to buy affordable health insurance cov-
erage exceeds congressional powers. By contrast, the
Department of Justice and supporters of the law assert
that the minimum coverage requirement is consistent
with a long line of Supreme Court decisions regarding
the power of Congress to regulate individual conduct.3
The Obama administration, in a brief filed on Jan. 9, ar-
gues that congressional authority to act can be found
under both its taxing powers as well as its power under
the commerce clause and necessary and proper clause
to regulate interstate commerce. The commerce clause
arguments are of special interest, because it is this ba-
sis of power that has received so much attention in the
lower court decisions to date.
How the court resolves the question of whether Con-
gress’s commerce clause powers support the minimum
essential coverage requirement will depend on how it
applies legal precedent to a law that is widely viewed as
unique.4 But before reaching the question of whether
1 No. 11-398; petition on Question 1 (Did Congress have the
power under Article I of the Constitution to enact the minimum
coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act? (2) Is the suit brought by respondents to challenge
the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26
U.S.C. § 7421(a)?) granted Nov. 14, 2011, http://
www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-00398qp.pdf. For a full listing of
all actions in the case since certiorari was granted see http://
www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/
11-398.htm.
2 PPACA § 1501(b) adding § 5000A to subtitle D of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986.
3 See, e.g., Brief of the United States on Question One in
HHS. v. Florida, (Jan. 9, 2012). http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/
11-398_petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d
529 at 558-559 (Sutton J. concurring) citing CBO Memoran-
dum, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to
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the solution is constitutional, the court first must decide
whether the conduct that the Act regulates (i.e., indi-
viduals’ health insurance status) is a matter that affects
commerce.5
This article focuses on this threshold question of how
to characterize or describe the problem that Congress
has sought to address through the enactment of law in
relation to its constitutional powers, in this case, its
powers under the commerce clause. Following a brief
overview of the scope of congressional power under the
commerce clause, whose reach is considered central to
this case, we turn to the minimum essential coverage
provision and the congressional findings on which it
rests. The article then presents evidence from the
health services research literature that shows the extent
to which being uninsured affects the broader economy.
The article next examines how the various Courts of
Appeal that have ruled to date have addressed this task
of problem definition. It concludes with a discussion of
the broader implications for health policy of how the
court ultimately defines the problem of being unin-
sured.
The Scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
Powers
The Supreme Court has recognized three broad areas
in which Congress can lawfully regulate under the com-
merce clause:6 (1) the use of the channels of interstate
commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce or persons or things in interstate commerce; and
(3) those activities having a substantial relation to inter-
state commerce . . . . i.e., those activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.7 The three federal ap-
peals courts that reached the merits (the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, whose decision to
strike down the minimum essential coverage require-
ment is the one that the court will review,8 and the
Courts of Appeal for the Sixth and D.C. Circuits, which
upheld its constitutionality9) focused on the third area
in the trilogy, namely, whether being uninsured
amounts to an activity that substantially affects inter-
state commerce.
Under Supreme Court precedent, two types of indi-
vidual activities might be said to substantially affect in-
terstate commerce. First, individual activity, even if
purely local and intrastate, can, when aggregated, have
an impact on commerce. For example, in perhaps the
most foundational precedent in this case, Wickard v.
Filburn,10 the court held that the decision by a single
wheat farmer to fend for his family by growing his own
supply rather than entering the commercial market for
wheat had a substantial impact on commerce and thus
was subject to government regulation; while one farm-
er’s actions, standing alone, might have been insubstan-
tial, the aggregated effects were other wheat farmers to
make the same decision would have been quite substan-
tial. Furthermore, the court has ruled that Congress can
reach individual conduct that is purely intrastate and
noneconomic in nature when its regulation is part of a
broader regulatory scheme to address an overarching
national problem affecting commerce and the
economy.11
The Minimum Essential Coverage
Requirement: Congressional Findings
The minimum essential coverage requirement is de-
signed to assure that most U.S. taxpayers who can af-
ford to do so acquire insurance coverage.12 To effectu-
ate this goal, the Act adds an ‘‘individual responsibility’’
requirement to the Internal Revenue Code; this require-
ment provides that most taxpayers with incomes above
the federal filing threshold13 must show evidence of
‘‘minimum essential coverage,’’ as defined under the
Act.14 Taxpayers who do not provide such evidence
must pay a penalty pegged to the national average price
of a ‘‘bronze’’ level insurance policy,15 subject to an an-
nual upper limit.16 This requirement is accompanied by
comprehensive market reforms to prevent discrimina-
tion against the sick,17 refundable tax credits and cost
sharing assistance to make coverage more affordable,18
and the establishment of state health insurance Ex-
changes through which health insurance can be pur-
chased;19 collectively, these provisions aim to make in-
surance both affordable and available. The Act’s insur-
ance reforms are accompanied by a wide-ranging
restructuring of numerous existing laws in order to
strengthen public insurance, expand coverage to the
poorest Americans, and address deeper problems of
health care quality, cost, and efficiency through perfor-
mance improvement initiatives and public health in-
vestments.20
The Act’s congressional findings clarify that where
the minimum essential coverage requirement is con-
cerned, congressional intent was to address a problem
of national economic importance: the fundamental mis-
match between the country’s approach to financing
health care on one hand and Americans’ need for and
use of health care on the other. This mismatch is the re-
sult of three basic factors, all of which are addressed
under the Act: (1) a limited and weakening employer-
Buy Health Insurance at 1 (August, 1994) and Congressional
Research Service, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health In-
surance: A Constitutional Analysis at 8-9 (Oct. 15, 2010).
5 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 37, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605 (2000).
6 U.S. Constitution, Art. 1 § 8.
7 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 at 558-559 (1995).
8 Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). http://
www.healthreformgps.org/wp-content/uploads/ruling.pdf
9 Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th
Cir. 2011) http://www.healthreformgps.org/wp-content/
uploads/ACA-6th-circuit-062911.pdf and Seven-Sky v. Holder,
661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) http://www.healthreformgps.org/
wp-content/uploads/DC-Court-of-Appeals-Ruling.pdf.
10 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
11 Gonzalez v. Raich 545 U.S. 1 at 25 (2005).
12 The Act contains certain exemptions and exceptions, in-
cluding a religious exemption and a hardship exemption. The
requirement does not reach persons not lawfully present in the
United States or individuals who are incarcerated, 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A(d) and (e) added by PPACA § 1501.
13 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(2) added by PPACA § 1501.
14 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f), added by PPACA § 1501.
15 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1), added by PPACA § 1501.
16 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(2), added by PPACA § 1501.
17 See, e.g., §§ 2701 (fair health insurance premiums), 2704
(prohibiting pre-existing condition exclusions), 2703 (guaran-
teed availability of coverage) and 2704 (guaranteed renewabil-
ity of coverage), added by PPACA § 1201.
18 PPACA § 1401 adding 26 U.S.C. § 36B, advance refund-
able tax credits and PPACA § 1402, related to cost-sharing re-
ductions.
19 PPACA § 1311.
20 PPACA Titles II through VI.
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sponsored coverage market; (2) a dysfunctional indi-
vidual insurance market that cannot operate as a viable
alternative for working-age individuals and families
without access to employer coverage; and (3) the ab-
sence of sufficient public insurance coverage for the
most impoverished nonelderly persons.21
The Congressional findings begin with the assertion
that ‘‘the individual responsibility requirement . . . is
commercial and economic in nature, and substantially
affects interstate commerce . . .’’22 Supreme Court pre-
cedent makes clear that congressional assertions of a
nexus between a problem and interstate commerce
alone are insufficient to uphold the constitutionality of
a law.23 In this case, however, the findings point to cer-
tain evidence of this basic misalignment, which by now
should be familiar to most students of health policy:
first, the fact that in the absence of a coverage require-
ment, some individuals ‘‘make an economic and finan-
cial decision to forego health insurance and attempt to
self-insure,’’24 thereby increasing financial risks to both
‘‘households and medical providers’’;25 second, the fact
that private health insurance finances approximately
one-third of the health care that is consumed;26 third,
the fact that the uninsured are in poorer health and cost
the national economy more than $200 billion annually
as a result of poorer health and shorter lifespans;27 and
fourth, the fact that when they are sick, the uninsured
receive health care nonetheless, thereby shifting tens of
billions of dollars in uncompensated care costs ($43 bil-
lion in 2008 alone) onto persons with public and private
health insurance, leading to an increase in family pre-
miums ‘‘on average over $1,000 a year.’’28 These find-
ings are in addition to other congressional findings con-
tained in the Act that establish a nexus between inter-
state commerce and regulation of the private insurance
market. But the nexus between the insurance industry
and commerce has been explicitly recognized by the
court for decades 29 and thus does not raise the same
‘‘first impression’’ issue that arises in the case of the
minimum essential coverage requirement.
The Evidence Base for the Affordable Care
Act’s Congressional Findings
The congressional findings regarding the relation-
ship between the ACA coverage requirement and inter-
state commerce rest on a wealth of evidence demon-
strating the fractured nature of the relationship be-
tween health care financing and the use of care, a
phenomenon most clearly illustrated by the large vol-
ume of hospitalization care (more than 2.1 million sepa-
rate cases of hospitalization) furnished to uninsured pa-
tients annually.30 Evidence amassed and analyzed by
health services researchers sheds considerable light on
the economic spillover effects of being uninsured, not
only on individuals and their families, but more impor-
tantly in the context of the minimum essential coverage
requirement, on community and regional health care
systems and the economy as a whole.
Economic Spillover Effects of Being
Uninsured
Perhaps the most exhaustive review of the subject
was published by the Institute of Medicine over the
2001-2003 time period, which detailed the health,
health care, and economic spillover aspects of being un-
insured.31 The IOM findings underscore the fact that al-
though it is associated with delayed and inappropriate
care,32 being uninsured does not keep people out of the
health care system in times of emergency or urgent
need.33 Like the wheat farmer in Wickard, who tried to
remove himself from the commercial market, people
who go without health insurance nonetheless affect
commerce when, because of their unanticipated, ur-
gent, and costly need for health care, they use services
but risk the inability to pay for care at the point of ser-
vice.
In this regard, the IOM found enormous spillover ef-
fects. Specifically, the IOM concluded from its research
that communities whose residents experienced elevated
levels of being without health insurance also had fewer
beds per capita, fewer specialized services for condi-
tions such as psychiatric and alcohol dependence and
AIDS, fewer intensive care beds, weaker burn and
shock trauma care, and lower financial margins.34 The
IOM findings underscore the aggregated economic ef-
fects of uninsurance across communities and regions.
In its report, the IOM pictorialized the ‘‘cascade of ef-
fects’’35 that are both ‘‘causal and temporal’’36 and that
flow from the lack of health insurance at the individual
level, as represented in Figure 1.
21 See generally, Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Insur-
ance: A Primer (2011).
22 PPACA § 1501(a)(1).
23 Id. at 614.
24 PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(A).
25 Id.
26 PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(B).
27 PPACA § 1502(a0(2)(E).
28 PPACA § 1502(a)(2)(F).
29 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Associa-
tion, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
30 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Re-
search Brief: The Value of Health Insurance: Few of the Unin-
sured Have Adequate Resources to Pay Potential Hospital Bills
(2008).
31 Institute of Medicine, Coverage Matters: Insurance and
Health Care (National Academy Press, 2001); Institute of
Medicine, Care Without Coverage: Too Little; Too Late (Na-
tional Academy Press, 2002); Institute of Medicine, Health In-
surance is a Family Matter (National Academy Press, 2002);
Institute of Medicine, A Shared Destiny: Community Effects of
Uninsurance (National Academy Press, 2003).
32 Institute of Medicine, Care Without Coverage, op. cit. Ch.
3.
33 Institute of Medicine, Coverage Matters, op. cit. Ch. 1.
34 Institute of Medicine, A Shared Destiny, op. cit. Chs. 3
and 4.
35 IOM, Care without Coverage, op. cit. p. 105.
36 IOM, Care without Coverage, op. cit. p. 106.
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If anything, the extent of this spillover impact identi-
fied by the IOM is understated. Since 2000, when the
IOM began its studies, the proportion of nonelderly
adult Americans without health insurance has risen sig-
nificantly. A decade ago, the figure stood at 14.8 per-
cent; by 2010 it had risen by a full 25 percent, to 18.5
percent of all nonelderly adults. This rise reflects nu-
merous social and economic trends that are relentlessly
eroding the voluntary employer-sponsored health insur-
ance scheme that the ACA is designed to bolster and
supplement.37
This aggregated economic spillover effect flowing
from the absence of health insurance is further evident
in data drawn from vital statistics and specific popula-
tion group studies.
Births to Uninsured Women
Data from the nation’s vital statistics system indicate
that in 2009, virtually all births (99.7 percent) occurred
within the health care system,38 defined as a birth that
occurs in a health care setting such as a hospital (or en
route to a hospital), free-standing birthing center, clinic,
doctor’s office, or at home and attended by a clinical
health care professional.39 At the same time, estimates
drawn from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS)40 regarding the proportion of births to women
who are uninsured at the time of delivery show that
during the 2003-2007 time period, approximately 1.1
million pregnant women—approximately one-quarter
of all pregnant women—were uninsured during part or
all of their pregnancies. The absence of health insur-
ance to pay for an absolutely essential health care need
such as pregnancy and newborn care in turn exerts
huge pressures on health care systems and public insur-
ance programs, especially Medicaid. The MEPS data
project that each year, some 425,000 women (10 per-
cent of all pregnant women per year) will be uninsured
in the month of delivery, while 8 percent (nearly
328,000 women) will be uninsured throughout their
37 John Holahan and Vicki Chen, Changes in Health Insur-
ance Coverage in the Great Recession (Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2011) http://www.kff.org/
uninsured/upload/8264.pdf (Accessed online Jan. 3, 2012).
38 Births: Final Data for 2009. National Vital Statistics Re-
ports, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vol. 60, No.
1, November 2011 at 13, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/new_
births.htm.
39 Id. Based on our analysis of the vital statistics, this esti-
mate in fact may be conservative, since births in which health
care use is not specified (i.e., categorized as ‘‘other’’ or ‘‘un-
specified’’ in terms of setting or attendant) are classified as oc-
curring outside the health care system.
40 MEPS is an annual series of surveys conducted by the
federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, which
surveys a nationally representative sample of non-
institutionalized people in U.S. households and collects a vari-
ety of data about their insurance status, personal characteris-
tics, health needs, health care utilization, and health care ex-
penditures, based on both surveys of the individuals and of
their health care providers. The survey is a widely used source
of analytical data about the U.S. health care system, health
care utilization, and expenditures.
Figure 1. The Impact of Being Uninsured
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pregnancies.41 Women who go through a pregnancy
without health insurance—predominantly young adults
ages 20-29—comprise two-thirds of those who were un-
insured throughout their pregnancies.42 Lower-income
women (family incomes under 200 percent of the fed-
eral poverty level)— a group most likely to be aided un-
der health reform—represent 60 percent of the popula-
tion uninsured throughout pregnancy.43
Nonfatal Injuries Involving Use of Hospital Emer-
gency Departments
A fundamental problem flowing from the mismatch
between health care financing and the need for and use
of care is the essentially unpredictable nature of need
and use. In no case is this unpredictability more in evi-
dence than in the case of hospital emergency care. The
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA) obligates all Medicare-participating hospi-
tals with emergency departments to provide screening
and stabilization services to persons who come to the
hospital emergency department seeking treatment for
an emergency medical condition.44 Data from the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) measure
the extent of nonfatal injuries—among the most unpre-
dictable of health problems—that are treated in hospital
emergency department settings.45 In 2010, more than
13 percent of American adults ages 20-24 and over 12
percent of those ages 25-29s were treated in a hospital
emergency department for a nonfatal injury. Figures
hovered at or near 10 percent that year for individuals
ages 30 to 44.46 Furthermore, treatment does not stop at
the emergency department. As Figure 2 shows, with in-
creasing age comes an increasing probability that treat-
ment will continue on to inpatient admission or transfer
to another facility for specialized care. By age 50-64,
more than 10 percent of all persons receiving a nonfatal
injury and treated in a hospital emergency department
also require further hospitalization or transfer.
High Rates of Physical Health Problems that Trigger
Use of Health Care
Health care use is tied to health problems, and here,
the high rate of chronic illness and physical disability
among the U.S. population has been well documented.
Furthermore, prevalence increases significantly across
the life course. This means that most Americans face
health issues that require medical attention and man-
agement as they age. Analysis of data from the Ameri-
cans’ Changing Lives Study, a nationally representative
longitudinal survey, reveals that the percentage of
Americans that can be considered as having physical
health problems increases precipitously from young
adulthood to old age. ‘‘Unhealthy’’ in this analysis was
defined as having a physical impairment or disability,
rating one’s own health as fair or poor, having a diag-
nosis of cancer, diabetes, stroke or heart disease, and/or
not dying between study waves.
As shown in Figure 3, over the 15 -year time period
of the Americans’ Changing Lives Study, the proportion
of adults who can be considered ‘‘unhealthy’’ increased
significantly over time in all age groups. Figure 3 shows
that by age 50, the majority of Americans face one or
more serious physical health risks or conditions that re-
quire medical care and attention. For example, while
only slightly more than 10 percent of individuals falling
into the 24-39 age cohort in 1986 experienced serious
physical health problems requiring medical attention,
by 2001 this group experienced a 262 percent rise in the
presence of physical health problems, with the propor-
tion of those over the 15-year period surpassing 30 per-
cent. In the case of persons falling into the 40-54 age co-
hort in 1986, the proportion of persons that can be la-
beled as being unhealthy rose from 26 percent in 1986
to 55 percent in 2001, a 212 percent increase. Note that
the proportion of the population considered ‘‘un-
healthy’’ would be even higher if mental health prob-
lems and other common chronic conditions such as
asthma, arthritis, and obesity were to be considered.
Analyses of the 2010 National Health Interview Sur-
vey further reveal the inexorable effects of aging on
health status. Almost half (48 percent) of Americans
ages 40-49 report ever having a serious chronic disease
41 Kenneth Thorpe and Katya Galactionova, The Distribu-
tion of Health Insurance Coverage Among Pregnant Women in
2007 (March of Dimes, 2010), http://www.marchofdimes.com/
downloads/The_Distribution_of_Health_Insurance_Coverage_
among_Pregnant_Women.pdf (Accessed Jan. 3, 2012).
42 Id. Chart 4.1.1.
43 Id. Chart 4.4.1.
44 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2010).
45 2010 National Electronic Injury Surveillance System—All
Injury Program (NEISS-AIP).
46 Overall All Injury Causes, Nonfatal Injuries: 2010, United
States, All Races, Both Sexes, Ages 0 to 85+, Disposition: All
Cases. National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention.
Figure 2. Non-Fatal Injuries by Age Group
Figure 3. Health Status Over the Life Course
Proportion of Adults in Age Cohorts Who Are Physically Unhealthy Over Time, American
Changing Lives Study, 1986-2001
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such as diabetes, cancer, arthritis or asthma.47 The level
of chronic disease burden rises as people age, increas-
ing to two-thirds (67 percent) for those in their 50s and
to over three-quarters (77 percent) of those ages 60 to
64.
Use of Medical Care Over Time
Undergirding the evidence related to the need for
health care is the fact that, as with births, over time, the
use of health care is an absolute inevitability. In any
given year, a certain proportion of people will go with-
out health care because they are relatively healthy or
perhaps because they cannot afford care they are unin-
sured. However, the avoidance of medical care cannot
last for long and virtually everyone eventually partici-
pates in the health care marketplace over a multi-year
period. Data from MEPS, presented in Figure 4, show
that among nonelderly adults (those at greater risk for
lack of insurance), virtually all individuals will receive
medical care at some point over a 10-year time period.48
Even among younger adults, as Figure 4 indicates, the
proportion that can be classified as non-users at the end
of a 10-year timespan reaches a vanishing point; by the
10th year, virtually the entire population of nonelderly
adults, including the younger adults, has received medi-
cal care.
The Interstate Nature of Health Care Use
A final fact worth observing is the flow of the popula-
tion using health care across state lines, elevating the
economic concern regarding the spillover impact of be-
ing uninsured from being one of purely local dimension
to one that substantially affects commerce. Modern
Americans are mobile and frequently move from one
state to another, whether for long-term or short-term
reasons. These interstate movements have repercus-
sions for health care needs, as well as for the costs of
medical care services used. Analysis of the Census Bu-
reau’s American Community Survey49 shows that in
2009, 6.5 million nonelderly individuals (children and
nonelderly adults) relocated from one state to another
in 2009.50 The data indicate that those who cross state
lines are about one-third more likely to be uninsured
than those who stay within a single state. Some 23.9
percent of those who moved across state lines that year
were uninsured, compared with 17.3 percent of those
who did not cross state lines.
Beyond general mobility is the challenge of general
interstate travel and the use of medical care, particu-
larly in light of hospitals’ EMTALA obligations. People
may need medical care when they travel, and uninsured
travelers create uncompensated care problems when
they move from their home state into the health care
market of another state. Medical emergencies do not re-
spect state boundaries and often afflict short-term trav-
elers. The magnitude of this problem is illustrated by a
recent study that examined emergency hospital admis-
sions.51 From 1996 to 2003, out-of-state tourists (those
who listed their residences as being outside the state of
Florida) experienced 36,800 hospital admissions follow-
ing a medical emergency. The proportion of persons
hospitalized as a result of medical emergencies who ap-
peared to be uninsured was more than one-fifth higher
among the out-of-state visitors (7.4 percent of out-of-
state resident admissions uninsured compared to 6.1
percent of in-state admissions uninsured).
How the Courts of Appeals Have
Approached Problem Definition in
Characterizing the Mismatch Between
Health Care Financing and the Need for and
Use of Health Care
The three appellate courts to have reached the merits
of the constitutional claim regarding the minimum es-
sential coverage requirement present a stark contrast in
problem definition, a fact that helps illuminate the dif-
ferent conclusions they reached. The Courts of Appeal
for both the Sixth and D.C. circuits, both of which up-
held the constitutionality of the coverage requirement,
launched their analyses from a beginning vantage point
47 Data are based on our analyses of the National Health In-
terview Survey, a nationally representative survey conducted
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which ex-
amines people’s health status and medical conditions. The
chronic conditions considered in this analysis included arthri-
tis, asthma, cancer, coronary heart disease and relative cardio-
vascular problems, emphysema, hypertension, and stroke.
48 This is based on our analyses of merged 2007-8 Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey data for nonelderly adults who par-
ticipated in the survey for both years. We conducted analyses
of the percentage of people who went without medical care (in-
cluding ambulatory or inpatient medical care or prescription
drugs, but not including dental care) in 2007 and the additional
percentage who went without care in 2008. Based on the mar-
ginal probability of going without care in the two years, we es-
timated the percentage who would go without care over 10
years. The findings were almost exactly the same when we
analyzed the proportion of people who had no medical expen-
ditures over the period.
49 The American Community Survey is conducted in an on-
going basis by the Census Bureau and collects nationally rep-
resentative data for about 3 million people, making it among
one of the largest federal surveys.
50 These analyses were conducted by George Washington
University researchers using 2009 American Community Sur-
vey Public Use Microdata Sample (ACS-PUMS) from the U.S.
Census Bureau.
51 Joseph Doyle, Returns to Local Area Health Care Spend-
ing: Evidence from Health Shocks to Patients Far from Home,
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS 3(3): 221-43, July
2011.
Figure 4. Medical Care Use Over Time
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that cast the issue as one of how to square health care
financing with the reality of Americans’ participation in
the market for health care, much the way the Supreme
Court squared the behavior of the wheat farmer in
Wickard with the larger commercial market for wheat.
In Thomas More v. Obama, the Sixth Circuit was par-
ticularly clear about the conceptual framework under
which it was operating. In examining commerce clause
jurisprudence, the majority wrote that:
There is debate over whether the [minimum essential
coverage] provision regulates activity in the market of
health insurance or in the market of health care. In the
most literal, narrow sense, the provision might be said
to regulate conduct in the health insurance market by
requiring individuals to maintain a minimum level of
coverage. However, . . . [t]he Act considered as a whole
makes clear that Congress was concerned that indi-
viduals maintain minimum coverage not as an end in it-
self, but because of the economic implications on the
broader health care market. Virtually everyone partici-
pates in the market for health care delivery and they fi-
nance these services by either purchasing an insurance
policy or by self-insuring. Through the practice of self
insuring, individuals make an assessment of their own
risk and to what extent they must set aside funds or ar-
range their affairs to compensate for probably future
health care needs. Thus, set against the Act’s broader
statutory scheme, the minimum coverage provision re-
veals itself as a regulation of the activity of participat-
ing in the national market for health care delivery and
specifically, the activity of self-insuring for the cost of
these services.52
In his concurring opinion in Thomas More, Judge Jef-
frey Sutton emphasized the same focus on the broader
health care market (in which all Americans participate)
rather than the more limited market for health insur-
ance (in which some Americans do not):
As the claimants see it, Congress’s authority to ‘‘regu-
late’’ interstate ‘‘commerce’’ extends only to individu-
als already in the stream of the relevant commercial
market, in this instance health insurance. It no more
permits Congress to conscript an individual to enter
that market on the buy side than it permits Congress to
require a company that manufactures cars to peddle
health insurance on the sell side. . . . The issue is not
that simple, the government responds. What has prin-
cipally changed over the last two centuries is com-
merce. Even accepting the claimants’ characterization
of the law as regulating ‘‘non-activity,’’ the law still con-
cerns individual decisions that, when aggregated, have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Individuals
cannot disclaim the need to obtain health care and to
pay for it, as virtually everyone at some point will con-
sume healthcare services. . . . In my opinion, the gov-
ernment has the better of the arguments.53
In Seven-Sky v. Holder, the D. C. Circuit followed a
similar pathway, away from a narrow definition of the
purpose of the law and toward one that embraced a
broader view of the subject to be regulated (i.e., of regu-
lating participation in the market for health care, rather
than the narrower matter of being required to enter the
market for health insurance alone). The majority opin-
ion framed the law as follows: ‘‘[T]he Affordable Care
Act sought to reform our nation’s health insurance and
health care delivery markets with the aims of improving
access to those markets and reducing health care costs
and uncompensated care.’’54 Furthermore, in rejecting
the challengers’ narrowly drawn claims that the law
pushes Americans into a market for insurance rather
than regulating their relationships to the health care
market as a whole, the majority concluded that the case
was not simply about whether or not to buy health in-
surance, but how to pay for health care services. In the
end, the majority wrote, ‘‘the only thing that matters is
whether the national problem Congress has identified is
one that substantially affects interstate commerce.’’55
For the D.C. Circuit, it was ‘‘irrelevant that an indeter-
minate number of healthy, uninsured persons will never
consume health care and will therefore never affect the
interstate market. Broad regulation is an inherent fea-
ture of Congress’s constitutional authority in this area;
to regulate complex, nationwide economic problems is
to necessarily deal in generalities.’’56
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, in Florida v. HHS,
focused tightly on what the majority perceived as the
Act’s requirement that individuals enter the market for
health insurance from a point of economic inactivity.
Indeed, the majority opinion explicitly rejected any link
between the coverage requirement and individuals’ ac-
tivity in the broader economic market:
Congress, in exercising its commerce authority, must be
careful not to sweep too broadly by including within the
ambit of its regulation activities that bear an insufficient
nexus with interstate commerce. . . . In this regard, the in-
dividual mandate’s attempts to reduce the number of unin-
sured and correct the cost-shifting problem is woefully
overinclusive. The language of the mandate is not tied to
those who do not pay for a portion of their health care (i.e.
the cost shifters). It is not even tied to those who use health
care. Rather, the language of the mandate is unlimited, and
covers even those who do not enter the health care market
at all. . . . [T]he Act contains no language ‘which might limit
its reach to a discrete set of [activities] that additionally
have a connection with or effect on interstate commerce.
. . . Because the Supreme Court’s prior Commerce Clause
cases all deal with already-existing activity – not the mere
possibility of future activity (in this case, health care con-
sumption) that could implicate interstate commerce – the
Court never had to address any temporal aspects of con-
gressional regulation. However, the premise of the
government’/s position – that most people will, at some
point in the future, consume health care – reveals that the
individual mandate is even further removed from tradi-
tional exercises of Congress’s commerce powers.57
Of course, it is possible that the Supreme Court could
define the market that is the subject of ACA regulation
in a more narrow way while nonetheless finding that
the act of not buying insurance is an economic decision,
a conclusion reached by Judge Sutton in his Thomas
More concurrence.58 But the structure of the Act—a
fundamental re-calibration of the law insofar as health
insurance coverage and health care are concerned—
coupled with the congressional findings that form its
basis, as well as extensive evidence of the inevitable,
immediate, and universal need for and use of health
care, combine to create a powerful argument that the
framework for analyzing the constitutionality of the
minimum essential coverage requirement should be the
52 Thomas More v. Obama, 651 F.3d at 543.
53 Id. (Sutton, J. concurring) at 549-550 and 556.
54 Seven-Sky v. Holder 661 F.3d at 3.
55 Id. at 19.
56 Id. at 21.
57 Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d at 1293-1294.
58 Thomas More Law Center v. Obama 651 F.3d at 556-557.
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stability of the larger health care economy, of which in-
surance plays a crucial financial role.
Concluding Thoughts
In the Patient and Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Congress achieved a new milestone in U.S. health
policy. This milestone takes the shape of legislation
that, crafted as a single major reform effort, is designed
to stabilize health care for all Americans by addressing
the multiple and highly connected dimensions of the
modern American health care enterprise. At the core of
the legislation are interventions that will, when fully
implemented, bring stability to health care coverage
and costs by strengthening the risk pooling system on
which health insurance rests while opening up new fi-
nancing pathways for millions currently excluded from
existing public and private coverage arrangements.
Built around this core are reforms aimed at achieving
even deeper structural change in how health care is or-
ganized and delivered in order to promote both quality
and efficiency. These investments are accompanied by
an expansion of the range of interventions available to
improve the public’s health.
The principal thrust of the Supreme Court phase of
the Affordable Care Act will be its constitutional basis;
by definition, the judicial phase of the legislation fo-
cuses on its legal basis. As of June, the public most
likely will know whether the court’s message will be to
proceed with implementation or to return to the legisla-
tive enterprise to correct what the court concludes are
constitutional flaws in structure and design. The an-
swer to this question, at least insofar as the minimum
essential coverage requirement is concerned, depends
on how the court frames the problem that the Act is
meant to solve, as well as how it assesses the constitu-
tionality of a unique solution that has been structured to
reflect the strong market orientation of the modern U.S.
health care system. From a broader health policy per-
spective, the message of the Affordable Care Act is that
health insurance is only the first and most essential step
in positioning the broader health care market to be able
to respond to the deep challenges of access, cost, qual-
ity, and health outcomes that lie ahead.
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